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Abstract 
         The disintegration of Soviet Union caused many conflicts in Caucasus region and 
among them the most intractable dispute is Nagorno Karabakh. Despite many countries and 
international organizations mediation efforts conflict does not solve since 1990th. Sixteen 
years passed from the conflict but every negotiation process failed to produce any possible 
solution. The main problem of the conflict is not only the status of Nagorno Karabkah but 
also interests of mediators. This thesis examines the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia and investigates the cause of the conflict from historical and theoretical view 
and shows obstacles of the negotiation and mediation processes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Armenian and Azerbaijan’s struggle over Nagorno Karabakh (hereafter, NK) is one of the 
most savage disputes in the world, producing more than one million refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons and more than twenty thousand casualties. After the initial four years of 
war (1990-1994) approximately twenty percent of the Azerbaijani territory was occupied by 
Armenia (IOM 1999 p. 40), and the war situation was replaced by a stalemate or “no peace 
no war” situation. The current deadlock affects not only the two countries but also the entire 
region both politically and economically.  
 
When the conflict started, the character of dispute was internal, but after the 
disintegration of the USSR the conflict’s nature changed from internal to inter-state. Many 
scholars and politicians estimate that the main roots of this conflict are historical hatreds, 
religious aspects and remnants of the Soviet policy of “divide and rule”. According to 
estimations, conflict between the two nations began during the fourth century A.D on the 
grounds of religion. However, the two ethnic groups could not raise this issue for a long time 
due to colonization or suppression by various empires-Mongol, Ottoman, and Soviet- until 
1980s. In the last years of USSR, years of accumulative enmity exploded and first ethnic 
mobilization then armed clashes began.     
 
After the cease fire (May, 1994), on the negotiation table three major parties emerged-
Azerbaijan, Armenia and the normally unrecognized NK. According to international law, both 
parties’ claims are legal because Armenia’s main assertion is “self determination” and 
Azerbaijan’s is “territorial integrity” so these make the negotiation process more complicated, 
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and so the dispute has become intractable. During the last few decades, as the world’s map 
changed, the conflict was ignored by both international organizations and powerful countries. 
Then (1993-1994), the conflict started to threat not only two states but also neighboring states 
as well and casualties increased, and finally international and regional organizations, the EU, 
the U.S, Russia and other countries began to intervene to the conflict. Nevertheless, these 
interventions or mediation efforts did not reflect the willingness of organizations or states to 
find a solution for the conflict. Incompatible mediation efforts deepen the dispute and make 
the situation more desperate.  
 
This thesis aims to analyze the conflict comprehensively. In chapter one, we will examine 
the background of the conflict’s history from the earliest recorded time to the end of twentieth 
century. The chapter covers ancient times, then the medieval period-Mongol, Timor, and 
Ottoman rule-, the nineteenth and twentieth century of Russian and Soviet colonization and 
suppression of the conflict. Chapter two studies the conflict on ethnic grounds. Chapter three 
analyzes the negotiation processes and problems. The final chapter studies third party 
interventions and mediations.       
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CHAPTER I 
 
HISTORY AND ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT. 
 
 Caucasia1 is one of the particular geopolitical regions in the world. Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are both located in Transcaucasia 2. Although mountainous, the Transcaucasia is 
geographically important because it represents a strategic land bridge between Europe and 
Asia. Over time, this geostrategic importance has made the Transcaucasus a cross roads 
battleground of clashing empires (Croissant, 1998). The last conflict, the brutal NK war 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, is the most recent and pressing example of the history of 
battles. 
Figure 1. Map of South Caucasus and Transcaucasia.    
 
  Source: International Crisis Group.  
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/armenia_ICG_risking_war_Nov2007_187_nagorno_karabakh___risking_war.pdf 
                                          
1 Caucasia: A large region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea on the border between Eastern Europe and Asia 
2 Transcaucasia - a geographical region to the south of the Caucasus Mountains and to the north of Turkey that comprises Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Georgia. 
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 The Azerbaijan and Armenian struggle over NK emerged in twentieth century. During 
the Soviet era conflict was suppressed by the USSR government, then, during the 1980s, 
conflict remerged again. After the disintegration of the USSR, the conflict became a war. As 
a result of the three years war, millions of people became refugees and Internally Displayed 
Persons (hereafter IDP), and international organizations and foreign countries attempted to 
control two states to negotiate about the status of NK. The major problem in the negotiation 
process is deciding which country belongs to NK historically. This chapter explains 
historically which country controlled NK and the reasons of the conflict. 
 
1.1 Conflicting claims about early history.   
                                                             Figure 2. Map of Nagorno Karabakh.  
 In order to get historical 
information about NK, let us first 
examine the etymology of “Nagorno 
Karabakh”. The root of the word 
“Karabakh” comes from the Turkish 
and Persian languages.                   
“Kara” is a Turkish word and the 
meaning of the word is “Black”,                                         
and “bağ” means garden in Persian. 
The word “Nagorno” is a Russian 
word and means mountainous.                
Thus in the name of the region there                                                             
three different languages.                      Source: International Crisis Groups         
In fact these three nations–Persian, Turkish and Russian-have dominated the history of the 
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region (Svante 2001).            
  
     Azerbaijan and Armenia have different assertions over Nagorno Karabakh. Some 
Armenian historians claim that historically, NK belonged to Armenia and as visual evidence 
they mention some churches which are currently situated in NK. According to their claim, 
Armenia is a Christian country but Azerbaijan is an Islamic country, so the presence of 
churches in NK indicates that NK belonged to Armenia (Noble and Systermans 2008).  
 
 Against this claim, Azerbaijan historians (Z.Bunyadov, Y.Mahmudov) proved that 
Nagorno Karabakh historically was part of Azerbaijan territory. According to Azeri sources 
at the beginning of first century A.D Caucasian Albania3 (unrelated to the Balkan Albania) 
started to flourish and at that time Nagorno Karabakh was one part of an Albanian region. In 
the 400s AD Christianity began to spread in Albania under Byzantium auspices. After the 
400s AD Caucasus Albania started to get worse both economically and politically and in the 
700s AD the country was invaded by the Sassanid Empire4. After the disintegration of the 
Sassanid empire in 651, Caucasus Albania was controlled by the Arab Caliphate. In the 
aftermath of Arab domination, Islamification processes (VII-VIII AD) were started in the 
area.  From this point of view Azerbaijan scholars claim that before Islam took hold, 
Azerbaijan was one of Christian country and being churches in NK is normal but it does not 
mean that NK was belong to Armenia. 
        
 Moreover, Armenian historians assert that Nagorno Karabakh (called Artsakh by 
Armenians) was one fraction of the old Armenian Kingdom. According to Bournoutian 
                                          
3 Caucasian Albania was an ancient country and region that existed on the territory of present-day Republic of 
Azerbaijan and southern Dagestan. 
4 The Sassanid Empire or Sasanian Empire was the last pre-Islamic Persian Empire, ruled by the Sasanian 
Dynasty who reigned from 224 to 651 CE. 
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(2001) Nagorno Karabakh belongs to Armenia and now it is call Armenian Seghnakhs; “all 
those lands are populated by brave Armenian Christians, who have defended themselves with 
their own forces against both the Turks and the Persians for a long time” (Bournoutian 2001). 
Moreover according to Hewsen (1994) one of the most wizard kings of Armenian Kingdom-
Tigran II (he was living during first century BC) founded four cities in current NK area and 
after himself these cities called “Tigrankert”. Furthermore Artsakh (NK) was one of the ten 
provinces of the ancient kingdom of Armenia and Christianity began to spread in Artsakh 
during fourth century following the missionary activities of St. Gregory the Illuminator 
(Hewsen 1994). 
 
 After an Arab invasion in the seventh century, the Eastern side of Albania accepted Islam 
and this area were called Islam Albania (Azerbaijan). The Western side acknowledged 
Christianity and that area was called Christian Albania (Armenia). It is also estimated that the 
current conflict began at that time under religious aspects. (Great Soviet Encyclopedia 1973)   
 
   Another controversial issue is the history of NK from the twelfth to sixteenth century. 
According to Armenian sources, NK was an independent state during medieval times. On one 
hand, some Armenian historians claim that until the medieval era NK was a part of 
“Kingdom of Greater Armenia” and after the disintegration of Kingdom, NK or Artsakh 
formed as an independent state and was called the “Kingdom of Khachen”. During twelfth-
fourteenth centuries as an independent state Artsakh was ruled by three Armenian royal 
dynasties- Smbatian, Vakhtangian-Jalalian, and Dopian. At that time these dynasties not only 
ruled Nagorno Karabakh but also they ruled other neighboring regions as well. (Samuelian 
and Stone 1984)  
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  On the other hand, Azeri historians like Ziya M. Buniatov and Ilqar Aliyev assert that 
between1410-1468 NK was a part of Azerbaijanian state Kara-Koyunlu and after the 
disintegration of Kara-Koyunlu, NK entered into other Azerbaijanian state Ak-Koyunlu 
(1378-1508).  
 
       Other foreign historians like Suzanne Goldenberg, even maintain that during this 
time (XII-XVI) NK did switch between Arab, Mongol, Turkic and Persian control, so neither 
Azerbaijan nor Armenia controlled NK during medieval times (Goldenberg 1994). 
 
  From the above scenario, we can see that it is difficult to investigate the situation. 
However, Goldenberg’s idea seems relevant than the others, because during the medieval era 
in the region Timor’s empire, the Mongol empire and the Ottoman empire were the main 
powers and small countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan could not control their lands. The 
Ottoman and Timorous empires dominated the entire region at that time.   
 
            In the sixteenth century, Azeri Safavid Empire became a powerful empire in the 
region. The Safavid Empire encircled current Iran, some part of Iraq and Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and so forth. Even Armenian historians accept that the Safavid Empire was one of 
Azeri Empires and that they controlled NK as well. In sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the Ottoman and Safavid Empires struggled over Caucasus. At that time another power-
Russia-was rising under Peter I authority. Later Russia joined to the struggle over Caucasus. 
 
 
 
 
  
  8 
 
Figure 3. Map of Safavid Empire  
 
Source: http://www.h-net.org/~fisher/hst373/Maps/Safavid_Empire_1660.html 
        
       After the disintegration of Savafid Empire-1740- today’s Azerbaijan and Armenia was 
separated into “Khanate - semi-independent principalities” (Svante 2001).  Between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries one of Khanate was called Karabakh Khanate (current 
NK) and many Armenian historians recognize that Khanate of Karabakh was ruled by Turkic-
Muslim families. Karabakh Khanate and other Khanates (Baku, Kuba, Sheki, Shirvan, 
Derbent, Nakhjivan, and Yerevan) were ruled by Turkic Muslim families. It is significant that 
the Yerevan Khanate (current Yerevan: Armenian capital city) itself was an area with a 
mainly Muslim majority in 1826 (Bournoutian 1996).  In the end of eighteen century, Russian 
expansionism policy began and Russia’s influence over the Azerbaijani Khanates began with 
Karabakh Khanates and Karabakh Khanates as first Khanates which accepted Russian 
lordship (Swietochowski 1995).  Then Russia attempted to control all Caucasian regions from 
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1806 to 1809 and during 1812-1813 the first Russo-Persian war happened. In 1813 Russia 
and Iran signed the Gulistan treaty. According to the Gulistan treaty, Karabakh was officially 
passed from Persian control to Russian. The Gulistan treaty is one major piece of evidence 
which proves that NK was an Azerbaijani area during the eighteenth century. 
Figure 4. Map of Khanates.  
 
     Source: http://www.azerbaijanrugs.com/arfp-wool-historical_notes.htm 
 
  In 1871, the Baku oil boom happened and after this event many Armenians began to 
flow to Baku from Armenia and other Russian lands. In short time they occupied the higher 
industrial and managerial positions. At that time the Russian rulers preferred Armenians 
(religious aspects played a big role) and inherently Azeri people did not like it so tension 
began to arise from the first oil boom. Until 1905 conflict did not seem dangerous, however, 
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in 1905 the first Russian revolution began. Under the revolutionary condition Czarist 
authority could not pay attention to Azeri-Armenian conflict so, soon the conflict spread to 
South Caucasus. The first inquietations happened in Baku and soon spread to “Shusha in 
Western Karabakh”, and it is estimated that the first inter-ethnic riots erupted in Shusha 
(Svante 2001). Until now it is unclear that how those clashes started. On one hand, Erich 
Feigl and other Azerbaijan historians say that the during revolution period and after it 
“Dashnaktsutiun” (The Armenian Revolutionary Federation) was active in Azerbaijan and 
Armenian areas and they terrorized the Azeri people in Shusha city, so this events triggered 
the violence (Feigl 1991). On the other hand, Christopher Walk and other Armenian sources 
argue that the Azerbaijanis began the fighting, and Armenians responded to their actions, 
eventually resulting in what they term ‘the victory of the Armenians (Christopher).  In 2006, 
in the Quba region (one of Azeri region) over ten thousand human remains were found, 
which shows that during clash period Armenians killed more than ten thousand Azeris. 
According to Feigl, during clash period over 10,000 Azeris and other high level state officials 
in the Russian provincial governments were killed by the Dashnaks, including the “Russian 
governor Nahagidze” (Feigl 1991).  Then, in 1917 the Great Russian revolution began and at 
that time three Transcaucasian countries declared independence. 5  However, this 
independence only lasted for two years. In 1920 the Russian red army invaded all these three 
countries and then for these three countries a new era started – the “Soviet era”. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          
5 Azerbaijan declared independence in 1918, May, 28. Eastern Armenia became as independent country in 1918.May.  
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1.2 The Soviet Era (from Lenin to Gorbachev). Suppression of the Conflict. 
                                                        
  After the revolution USSR began to define the transcaucasian countries’ borders. At 
that time, tension remained between Azerbaijan and Armenia over NK. During three years 
new founded USSR settled the conflict. In December of 1920, with the participation of Stalin 
USSR central authority decided that NK, Zangezur and Nakhjivan would transfer to Soviet 
Armenian control and they sent plan to public on December 2. However, later the decision 
was denied by N. Narimanov who was head of the Soviet government of Azerbaijan during 
1920s (Svante 2001). After the “Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship” between the Soviet 
Union and Turkey, the situation was changed. According to the treaty, Nakhjivan and NK 
remained under control of Soviet Azerbaijan. Stalin made an agreement with Kemal Ataturk6 
about NK because at that time Stalin saw Turkey as a potential ally.  
 
 In 1920 the “Treaty of Sevres” was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Allies at the end of the World War I. In this treaty, Woodrow Wilson drew future Armenian 
state’s boundaries which included some of Turkey’s land.  
 
 
 
                                          
6 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a Turkish army officer, revolutionary statesman, and founder of the Republic of 
Turkey as well as its first President. 
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Figure 5. Map of Wilsonian Armenia 
 
       
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Ataturk understood that strong Armenia could have territorial claims on Turkey, thus he was 
hostile to any territorial arrangements favoring Soviet Armenia (Marina 1995).  But it was not 
the end of the game. In July 5, 1921 plenum of Kavbureau (Caucasus Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) decreed that NK was within 
Azerbaijan and would not be “transferring” it to anyone: “Nagorno-Karabakh to leave within 
the borders of Azerbaijan SSR” (Baguirov 2008). Then discussions took place on the status of 
NK within Azerbaijan SSR. On July 7, 1923 USSR authorities took a decision that NK was 
within Azerbaijan SSR as Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (hereafter NKAO) and the 
capital of NKAO was moved from Susha to Khankendi. In November 1924, NKAO was 
officially declared as an autonomous country. Armenians did not agree with this situation but 
at that time they could not do anything because they were frightened of Stalin, who had killed 
 Source: www.armeniapedia.org 
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over eight million people in the former Soviet Union .  
 
 During 1930 the Armenians attempted to get control over NKAO but again they faced 
Stalin and he rejected their claim again. The situation was getting bad for Armenians because 
in 1936 the Transcaucasian Federation disintegrated and NKAO was getting far from 
Armenia because it was given to Azerbaijan. Under this condition, Armenian leader of the 
time tried to raise the Kabarakh issue to the dismay of the Stalin and as a result he was 
assassinated by Stalin (Mutafian). In order to suppress the conflict Stalin assassinated 
thousands of people and some high level politicians. After the Stalin period, Krushchev came 
to power and also during his authority Armenians could not do anything and NK remained 
under control of Azerbaijan SSR.  
 
1.3 Escalation of the Conflict. 1988-1991 
 
 
         The NK conflict was the first major political mobilization in former USSR, which later 
transformed into an inter-state war between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Cheterian 2009).  
 
     In February 1988 in NK, Armenians started demonstrations in which they demanded 
the transformation of NK from Azerbaijan to Armenia. First, Supreme Soviet of the NKAO 
appealed to Supreme Soviet of Armenia that NKAO must annex Armenia and Azerbaijan 
SSR immediately rejected this process and they informed Moscow that it was a violation of 
the USSR constitution. The next day the Kremlin also rejected Armenian’s appeal. However, 
after Presidium’s7 decision in NKAO a mass demonstration was started. 
  
 The first clash between NK Armenian and Azeries happened in Askeran (February, 
                                          
7 Presidium-was a Soviet governmental institution 
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1988) and two young Azeries were killed by Armenians. According to Alexei Zverev Azeri 
people killed more than fifty Armenians in Sumgait (Azerbaijan industrial city) as a revenge 
of Askeran actions (Zverev 1996).  However, according to Azeri historian Ziya Bunyadov the 
action was done by the Kremlin and Soviet Armenia because Armenia’s aim was to show 
Azerbaijan to the world as an unjust country. On the other hand, in this incident some 
Armenians were fighting on the side of Azeri people against Armenian people in Sumgait city 
so it is obvious that it was accomplished by Armenians (Bunyadov 1988).  Indeed, after the 
Sumgait actions Armenians kept their position strong and they tried to persuade Moscow that 
there is pressure against Armenians in Azerbaijan. After the incident the USSR Supreme 
Court in order to revolt people against Armenian gave the death sentence to one Azeri citizen 
-Ahmed Ahmedov. This court order triggered many Azeries against Armenians in different 
cities of Azerbaijan.   
  
  Moscow intervened again, and Kremlin declared that NKAR was under direct rule of 
Moscow. In fact, at that time Kremlin had a lot of problems and they (presidium members) 
could not engage with this issue. In spite of the Moscow declaration, clashes continued 
between residents and government authorities. Then the conflict took a pause due to the 
Spitak earthquake-the earthquake took place in December 1988 with a magnitude of 6.9 and 
killed more than 25000 people-in Armenia (Svante 2001). 
 
 In January 1990, Gorbachev sent troops to Azerbaijan for protection of Armenians but 
the same troops killed more than one hundred Azeries and more than sixty Armenians on 
January 20. This event was included in history as “Black January”. It was obvious that USSR 
government would act cruelty against both Azeries and Armenians in order to break the 
clashes (Helsinki Watch/Memorial Report, 1991).  
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 In September of 1991 the NK national council (former Karabakh soviet) proclaimed 
NK as an independent republic. Inherently, it was an unacceptable situation for Azerbaijan 
and on 26 November 1991, Azerbaijan Supreme court passed a law abolishing the autonomy 
of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan sent troops to NKAO in order to prevent independence 
(Zverev 1996). However, in the response to Azerbaijan action, Armenia has created arm 
control over NK. In order to settle the situation Boris Yeltsin (the Russian president) and 
Nursultan Nazarbayev (the Kazakhstan president) attempted to find solution to this conflict. 
On 23 September 1991, as a result of their initiation, the two countries made agreement and 
conflict paused for short time.  
               
1.4 The Nagorno Karabakh War (1992-1994) 
 
 In December of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and fifteen countries were created. 
After the disintegration on February 18 1992, Armenians occupied Khojavend/Stepanaker 
(former capital of NKAO). We can estimate that this event was the beginning of the NK war. 
The night from the 25th to 26th of February in 1992 Armenian troops from the 366th regiment 
(made by USSR) attacked  Khodjaly town and killed hundreds of Azeries (Mammadova 
2006).  According to “State Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan On Deals Of Refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons”8 report at the result of Khodjaly genocide 613 Azeries 
were killed, other 153 persons were missing and 1275 Azeries were wounded.  However, 
according to Armenian sources, the deceased civilians were less than hundred and 
furthermore they claim that the Azerbaijan was using Khodjaly as a base for rocket attacks on 
Stepanakert. Moreover they blamed “Azeris for using the Khodjaly residents as human 
                                          
8 It is a State based organization which making a statistics and policy for refugees and IDPs.  
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shields, and claimed that the civilians were caught in the cross-fire rather than massacred” 
(Svante 2001). Human Rights Organizations estimate that during February 26 and 27 in 
Khodjaly town from 200 to 1000 Azerbaijanis were killed by Armenians (Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki 1994).  On the other hand, according to Walker (1995), Armenian made a 
massacre in Khodjaly against Azerbaijanis but several events were not widely reported about 
this massacre: first Armenian army demanded urgent evacuation of Khodjaly and they 
warned people that they were planning to take the town. Secondly, after the capture of the 
Khodjaly, Armenians invited Azerbaijanis to declare Azeris death toll. After this event, war 
officially started between the two countries. After two months (in May of 1992) Armenian 
troops occupied Susha (NK’s capital) and then in the same month they could seized Lachin-
the most strategic city-Lachin is connect Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh. After Lachin it was 
not hard for Armenians to seize other Azerbaijan cities because in May 1992 they seized the 
Lachin corridor9.  
 
       In June 1992 Azerbaijan troops counterattacked the Geranboi region (Azerbaijan 
region) and Mardakert (province of NK) and were able to recapture these areas. According to 
Armenian sources, after this attack Azerbaijan created 40.000 ethnic Armenian refugees. 
Although Azerbaijan recaptured two cities in February of 1993 Armenians again captured 
these two cities and additionally after one month Armenia seized another Azeri city, Kelbajar. 
  
 At that time in Azerbaijan the domestic situation was not good. There was a civil 
conflict inside-in 1993 on the one hand, one part of Azerbaijan proclaimed independence 
(Talish Mughan Republic live only three month), on the other hand Surat Huseynov (was a 
Prime Minister of Azerbaijan) led a revolt against Ablufaz Elchibey (was a president of 
                                          
9 The Lachin corridor is a mountain pass within de-jure borders of Azerbaijan, it is the shortest route which 
connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. 
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Azerbaijan)- the country so in this situation the government could not control the country. On 
April 30, the UN Security Council accepted Resolution 822 which called for the two 
countries to cease-fire and for the withdrawal of “all occupying forces” from Kelbajar region 
(Appendix). Then three countries-Russia, Turkey and U.S- were set to implement the peace 
process in the region and they offered to both countries “a sixty day cease fire, end of energy 
blockade of Armenia, and continued peace talks” (The New York Times, May 27, 1993).  
Both countries accepted the plan but NK Armenians rejected it. Azerbaijan declared a cease 
fire (unilateral) on the 24th of  May. Then NK Armenians accepted the plan under pressure of 
Ter-Petrosyan (Armenian president). But plan was never implemented, rather in June 1993 
Armenian troops occupied another Azerbaijan province-Aghdere. Thus the tripartite peace 
plan was dead and war continued. Inherently, during this period hundreds thousands of 
people-785,010 IDP and refugees from Azerbaijan and 291,030 IDP and Refugees from 
Armenia- were flowing from NK (UNHCR 2005). NK Armenians were going to other 
Armenian cities and NK Azerbaijanis were coming to other Azerbaijan cities from NK.   
 
      In July of 1993 Armenian troops were able to seize more than half of the Aghdam 
region (the biggest region in Karabakh). According to Human Rights Watch report during the 
Agdam battle NK, Azerbaijan, and Armenia strongly violated rules of war (Human Rights 
Watch 1992).  “Hostage-taking or holding is explicitly forbidden in armed conflicts (Geneva 
Conventions). Both Azerbaijan and the Karabakh rebels have violated this prohibition during 
the conflict.  
 
     In spite of many international organizations and foreign countries efforts to stop the 
violation, war continued and in August 1993, Armenian army troops seized three Azerbaijani 
regions- Cebrail, Fuzuli and Qubadli. The last Azerbaijani region –Zangilan- was occupied by 
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Armenians in November 1993. In February and April if 1994 some other armed conflict 
happened and more than 50.000 Azerbaijanis became Internally Displaced Persons (from now 
on IDP). Until 1994 the political situation was very bad in Azerbaijan because there was 
political struggle between parties inside the country. Many politicians did not care about the 
country’s fate but in 1994 Azerbaijan’s great leader Haydar Aliyev came to power. Firstly he 
put in order internal disputes and many criminal groups were arrested, then he attempted to 
stop the war. On May 12th, 1994, in Bishkek (capital of Kyrgyzstan) both countries signed a 
cease-fire agreement and after 1994 long negotiations start between two countries.  
 
 
Table 1.  Refugees and  IDPs in Azerbaijan (breakdown by cities and 
regions) 
 
 
 
 
Total Number of IDPs in Azerbaijan: 603,251 
Source: UNHCR 2009. (http://www.unhcr.org/4bd7edbd9.html)  
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 Table 2. Refugees and IDPs in Armenia  
 
 
Source: UNHCR 2005 (http://www.unhcr.org/4641835e0.html)  
 
    Consequently from the researches it is obvious that there are a lot of problems in 
Caucasia and many countries’ interests clash in this area. Caucasia has always been the focus 
of attention from superpowers. In the twentieth century, especially after the Cold War, some 
grave wars happened like NK war and those wars also brought innovation to geopolitics. In 
the twenty first century states are not free in order to declare war as before and in the 
international arena there is a balance of power. In the new century making war is not as easy 
as before and the new balance of power also shifts geopolitics and most probably new 
geopolitics will bring peace in Caucasia soon.       
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS: ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT 
 
  Generally many scholars estimate that major root of the Nagorno Karabakh (NK) 
conflict is historical hatred.  This chapter explains the root of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict 
through not only ancient hatred but also the economic and political causes in this conflict.  
 
 The Nagorno Karabakh is one of the major ethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia. Thus, to 
properly explore this point of view, let us look first at is the definition of ethnic conflict, 
ethnicity and ethnic group, and then turn to the cause of ethnic conflict. A few theories are 
about ethnic conflict. These theories on the one hand try to explain what is the root and cause 
of ethnic conflict, while on the other hand attempt to create models which negotiators can use 
to bring sustainable solution for ethnic conflict.  
 
 Firstly we have to define what ethnic conflict is. According to Lake and Rothchild 
there are three approaches to ethnic conflict or ethnicity.  
  
 The first one is the Primordialist Approach. This approach “takes ethnicity as a fixed 
characteristic of individuals and communities”. In this approach, “certain characteristics 
could be rooted in inherited biological traits or centuries of past practice that are now beyond 
the ability of the individuals or groups to change” (Lake 1998).  This explains that if there are 
different ethnicities in any society, it is an ample precursor for ethnic conflict or tension. As 
an example we could mention Rwandan civil war-between two ethnic groups; Hutu and Tutsi 
(1994). That war was not the first one in Rwanda, before the war many clashes happened 
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between ethnic Hutu and Tutsi. Their different ethnic identities set Hutu and Tutsi at odds 
with each other and they are unable to live in peace.   
 
 The second approach is the Instrumentalist Approach. According to this approach, 
elites create ethnicity in order to control society and obtain political benefits. Ethnicity, itself 
is the elites’ tool, with which they can control the masses. It is not an independent entity, but 
rather is just one piece of the political process (Lake 1998). The best example for this 
approach is Hausa-Sunni Muslim people mainly located northern Nigeria- traders in Nigeria 
(Joireman 2003). During British colony in Nigeria, Hausa could get special treatment from 
colony and they claimed that they are different than other Nigerians. At that time they 
monopolized cattle trade in Nigeria. When Nigeria got independence, new government does 
not give them special privileges and government recognize them as a Nigerian like others. 
Under new political authorities Hausa people change Sunni Islam to “Sufi sect called 
Tijaniyya” (Joireman 2003). So from this example we could observe that for political and 
economical reasons elites create new ethnicity-from Sunni Islam to Sufi Tijaniyya-in order to 
control society and obtain political benefits.  
 
 The third approach is the Constructivist Approach. In this view, “ethnicity is neither 
immutable nor completely open; this approach posits instead that ethnicity is constructed 
from dense webs of social interactions” (Lake 1998).  
 
     After the explanation of three major approaches to ethnicity we can make a conclusion 
that NK war is belongs to instrumentalist approach because political and economical interests 
are the main reasons for this conflict. NK Armenians declared independence and they could 
get assistance from Armenia. At that time, there was a political turmoil inside Azerbaijan-
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during three years (1991-1993) government changed hands five times -and Armenian elites 
was understood that is the best time to get political power so they concentrate to get political 
power in the area of NK and they could do it. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is an oil-rich 
country so we can estimate that economics also was a main factor in that war.     
 
 Now let us examine what is “conflict”. According to Horowitz, “conflict is a struggle 
in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate 
rivals”  (Horowitz 2000).    
  
 Generally there are many types of conflicts like religious, territorial, economic, ethnic, 
and national and so forth. We can classify conflicts into two groups; international conflicts 
and internal conflicts. An International conflict is a conflict that happens between two 
sovereign countries or states. If the actions of two sovereign states are crucial for the 
continuation of the conflict, then that conflict has an international character (Svante 1997). 
Internal conflict is a conflict that involves ethnic and cultural tensions, religious and tribal 
rivalries, as well as domestic power struggles for governance or independence (Yilmaz).  
 
 Ethnic conflict comes from ethnic confrontation and is further divaricated by religion, 
ideology and so forth. From this viewpoint, instead of “ethnic conflict” modern scholars use 
the term “ethno-political conflict” (Horowitz 2000). In some cases ethnicities become 
politicized and it creates ethno-political conflict and when ethno-political conflict creates at 
that time groups begin to mobilize. If one asks why the group mobilization happens, the most 
likely reason is that groups assume that they have to eliminate their rivals (Horowitz 2000).  
 
      According to Brown there are four factors for mobilization-“Structural, political, 
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economic/social and cultural/perceptual” (Brown 2001).  
 
      Structural factors: This is the first factor for mobilization and according to this factor 
“weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography are the main reasons for 
mobilization” (Brown 2001). When a state or country begins to lose its’ political legitimacy 
or political institutions, at that time ethnic groups or minorities start to struggle for their 
independence or autonomy. This definitely happened in the NK case because in 1991 when 
the USSR collapse, in NK war was instigated and both sides tried to be independent. It is not 
the only factor for NK war. Another factor is political factor.   
  
      Generally there are four main political factors; “discriminatory political institutions, 
exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics” (Brown 2001). 
According to discriminatory political institutions insufficient participation of ethnic groups in 
“government, the courts, the military, the police, political parties and other political 
institutions” caused ethnic conflict (Brown 2001). During the Tsarist and Soviet eras there 
were many Armenians in Azerbaijan’s government, police systems or in military however in 
the Armenian government, policy system or in military there was small number of Azeri. 
Moreover, from medieval times Armenian people have an idea of a “Great Armenia”10. 
According to Armenians, NK was one piece of “Great Armenia” and they always think about 
NK without Azerbaijanis so Armenians have exclusionary national ideologies. In inter-group 
politics if groups are religiously different it is prospect for violence (Brown 2001) so 
Armenian is Christian but Azerbaijanis is Muslim. As we know, if there is a political factor in 
any conflict, inherently there is economical factor as well. It is also same in this conflict so 
                                          
10 According to idea of The Greater Armenia; modern Republic of Armenia, East Anatolia, NK, Nakhchevan 
Autonomous Republic and some part of modern Georgia are the part of Armenia.  
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the other factor is Economic/Social factor in mobilization. According to Brown, “economic 
problems, discriminatory economic systems and economic development and modernization 
are factors of mobilization”. Especially the discriminatory economic system is a triggering 
point for mobilization (Brown 2001). One group gets a lot of economic support, however 
other groups cannot. This inherently creates economic imbalance between ethnic groups and 
so a group which has less economic support starts to mobilize for struggling against other 
groups.  
 
 Finally the last factor is cultural/perceptual factors. Cultural discrimination and 
perceptions stand in the centre of this factor. In many cases, cultural discrimination is carried 
out against ethnic group and this ethnic group is humiliated by other ethnic group or 
government. In this situation mobilization is only way out (Brown 2001). As we mentioned 
before the Christianity and Islam-there are different culture in these religions- was a main 
cultural difference between NK Armenians and Azeris.    
  
 Wimmer explains that one of the reason for ethnic mobilization is power sharing. 
They clarify that to gain legitimacy; political elites in control of executive level state power 
will favor co-ethnics when decided with whom to ally and to whom to distribute public goods. 
Politics will then center on the question of which ethnic group controls which share of the 
executive government and the struggle over state power will pit ethnically defined actors 
against each other (Wimmer 2004).  It is also true that if the state excludes an ethnic group 
from power, this ethnic group inherently starts to mobilize against any other ethnic group 
which is large scale in power.   
 
  In the NK case, neutralization and mobilization started after 1985. At that time the 
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USSR was getting weak and NK’s people also understood that there was a question-who or 
which country will derive the borders. For this reason people started to consider 
neutralization and modernization. On the other hand, NK’s Azerbaijanis were observing the 
situation and they knew that before Soviet authority two nations have had some clashes over 
this land so as an alternative answer to NK’s Armenian they also started to mobilize. During 
1988 NK Armenian began to protest that they want to live as an Armenian within Armenia 
and we can say it was a beginning of the mobilization of NK Armenians. On the other hand, 
as a response to this claim NK Azeri people and government protest Soviet government that, 
NK is an integral part of Azerbaijan and it could not give to Armenia in any condition. The 
result of both mobilization, clashes began between two nations-the first one was in one of NK 
city Askeran and two Azeri teens killed by Armenians and the second one happened in one of 
the Azeri cities Sumgait and approximately twenty six Armenians and six Azerbaijanians 
killed during these clashes. 
 
 The mobilization of Armenians and Azeris was no doubt aided by the process of 
modernization. According to Horowitz there are three types of modernization: Absolute 
levels of modernization, Absolute Rates of Modernization, and Group Disparities. 
 
  Absolute levels of modernization: This type of modernization analysis that how 
modernization affect to the entire population in any area. The demand of population is similar 
but resources are insufficient for some part of population-like urbanization or shifts from 
agriculture to industry. Inherently, it creates competition in the society-among ethnic groups- 
and in order to get equal resources group clashes take place. Unlike levels of modernization, 
rates of modernization regarding with economical issue in society. According this theory 
when rates of changes-economic-are higher in different part of society it creates  
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problems between groups. In less modernized places ethnic mobilization will be higher than 
other place (Horowitz 2001).   
      
  In the perspective of Group Disparities, ethnic groups that “ are more wealthy, better 
educated and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented and sometimes feared by others and 
the basis for this sentiments is the recognition of their superior position in the new system of 
stratification” (Horowitz 2001). Among these approaches we can apply Group Disparities to 
the NK conflict. In the NK case, especially during the Soviet era many Armenians were 
living in urban areas and they were holding high positions in some Soviet countries. Even in 
Azerbaijan, their educational level was also higher than that of the Azeries. At that time they 
could get more benefit from Azerbaijan than the Azerbaijani people.   
 
 In the former USSR especially in autonomic area, we can divide people in two 
groups: first autonomous minorities and non-autonomous minorities. The Soviet government 
could control them with suppression but after the disintegration of USSR these minorities 
which were non autonomous began to define certain area for themselves as a country. This 
created many ethnic conflicts like the NK conflict as well as the Chechnya conflict. I the 
latter, in 1999 Russia declared war against the rebels and suppressed the Chechen people. 
Additionally, in 2008 the “five days” war between Russia and Georgia was also the fruit of 
USSR autonomous policy. 
 
 Consequently, we can estimate the main root of this conflict as USSR’s autonomous 
policy. During the 1920s and 1930s, Lenin and Stalin created more than thirty autonomous 
republics like NK in Azerbaijan or South Ossetia in Georgia and some in central Asian 
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countries. “Autonomy, in specific circumstances, contributes significantly to the likelihood of 
violent conflict” (Svante 2001). They did it intentionally because at that time separating 
countries was very useful for the Soviets in order to could control all fifteen countries. On the 
other hand, some referendums were held during the Soviet Union about self-determination of 
nations but it did not happen with democratic ways. During the 1940s and 1950s, thousands 
of people were moved illegally from NK to Central Asian countries by the Soviet government 
and then the Soviet government defined referendum about self-determination of nations. Is 
the referendum possible without one or two ethnic groups which they were living in NK? Of 
course it would normally be considered impossible, but for the Soviet Union it was possible 
and it was democratic way. Finally at the result of USSR autonomous policy now there are 
millions of refugees and internally displaced persons and thousands of casualties in three 
Transcaucasian countries.  
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CHAPTER III 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN THE CONFLICT. 
 
 As a result of the three years war between Armenian and Azerbaijan forces in NK, 
millions of people became refugees or IDP (Report of Parliamentary Assembly: doc 7182, 
1994) and the NK-Armenian authorities took control over NK and seven other Azerbaijan 
regions. May, 1994 the cease-fire agreement signed by two countries.  
 
 After the cease-fire sides were silent for two months and then they began to 
negotiation processes for to resolve NK conflict. The first negotiation held in Moscow: 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Karabakh represents discussed the problems and tried to solve the 
problem but it was futile. Although sides were made a meeting in Moscow (1994 August) but 
a comprehensive negotiation process began at 1996 in Lisbon-the capital of Portugal- with 
the participation of international organizations and states. In 1997 two proposals-package and 
stage by stage options-offered to parties by OSCE but both options rejected by Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. After fruitless negotiations the new option-common state-proposed by OSCE 
but like previous options that proposal also was failed. Then some other negotiation processes 
held in Paris and Key-West but all of them failed.    
 
 In the negotiation process two major problems are seen. On one hand, according to the 
U.N Charter no country can make a “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” (U.N Charter 1945). Now Azerbaijan claims that 
Armenia used force against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and they must take their 
military troops out of NK and other seven Azerbaijan regions.  
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 On the other hand, again according to U.N Charter, “every nation has the right to self-
determination” (U.N Charter 1945). The Armenian side claims that NK people must use their 
self-determination right. 11  From the first point of view we can observe that in the NK 
negotiation process the big problem is collision of “territorial integrity” and “self-
determination” rights. This chapter aims to explain the main negotiation process and the 
problems in negotiation and positions of the parties in the negotiation process. Furthermore, 
the chapter analyzes international organizations’ efforts in order to make a settlement in NK 
conflict and to discover the causes behind the current stalemate.  
  
3.1 Problems and perceptions in the negotiation process. 
 
 After the Second World War, the major powers of the world began to be sensitive to 
wars. Especially during the Cold War, states did not try to battle with each other. Then the 
USSR collapsed and new wars born but these wars were different than during the nineteenth 
or early twentieth century’s wars. These wars such as NK war or Georgia-Abkhazia war 
continued for a maximum of three or four years then sides start to negotiate. Countries could 
battle up to certain point then when situation began to be “risky” and “costly” for each side 
they would stop war and start to negotiate (Dean 2004). This can be seen in the NK war, 
when in 1994 when the Armenian side saw that Azerbaijan began to fight more effectively 
than before and Armenia lost a lot of soldiers, while on the other hand the political situation 
was unstable inside Azerbaijan in 1994. The situation was worse in 1994 for both countries 
and then they made a ceasefire in May of 1994. After this, a long negotiation process started.  
 
                                          
11 In reality in the self-determination process NK Azeries must participate because they were 
aboriginal people before the war.  
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 According to Dean “at the risk of simplification” there are two forms of negotiation. 
The first one is “eyeball to eyeball” negotiations, during which, in order to win, both parties 
are aggressive against each other. Parties blame each other for war or conflict. The second 
one is “side by side” negotiation during which parties try to solve problems “jointly”. Almost 
every conflict resolution negotiations starts with “eyeball to eyeball” and then if parties really 
desire to make an agreement, the negotiations turn from “eyeball to eyeball” to “side by 
side”(Dean 2004). NK negotiation processes started in 1994 and are still continuing. For 
fifteen years the parties have been negotiating with the “eyeball to eyeball” system and yet do 
not start “side by side” negotiation.     
 
 From 1995 until now in the negotiation process the major problem is the “status of 
NK”. Both parties are very contentious on this problem. In 1995 as well as the following 
negotiation processes, the Azerbaijan government proclaims that they are ready to give 
autonomy status to NK within Azerbaijan and it will be more than autonomy (“broad 
autonomy”) and “less than independence” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan made an offer that if the counter party accepts Azerbaijan’s 
“autonomy” proposal, NK will be self-ruled except for foreign policy and armed services. 
However, this offer has always been rejected by the NK-Armenian axis and they notified that 
the possible solution in the conflict is either an independent NK or unification with Armenia. 
Inherently, Azerbaijan refused this claim. Also in this scenario we can observe that parties 
stand on negotiation process with “position” not “interest” and the result has been a fiasco. 
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 As we explained in the previous chapter, the NK-Armenian axes did not occupy only 
NK territory, but they also seized seven other Azerbaijan regions. Almost every peace 
proposal demands that the seven occupied Azeri regions must be given back and NK and 
Armenian side agree to return areas which are outside of NK except the Lachin corridor.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.coe.intl   
Lachin district (including the Lachin district) originally is Azerbaijan’s region which linked 
NK to Armenia. One Karabakh official says that “We will never be an enclave again” (Svante 
1999). Azerbaijan is opposed to this idea and demanded all areas outside of NK, especially 
the Lachin corridor because it is originally Azeri territory and if Armenia or NK keep the 
Lachin corridor, in the future they can attack Azerbaijan again. Azerbaijan has promised NK 
and Armenian officials that if the Lachin corridor is returned to Azerbaijan it would be use 
Lachin 
corridor
Figure 6. Map of Lachin Corridor 
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only for trade between the two countries and not for military objectives. This is a deadlock 
situation in the negotiation process and until now parties could not find a possible solution 
about the Lachin corridor.  
 
 Another issue in the negotiation process is Nakhchivan problem. Nakhchivan is 
Azerbaijan’s autonomy- under Azerbaijan’s authority- but there is not a direct connection 
between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Zangezur is an area which was originally Azerbaijan’s 
territory but it is now under control of Armenia and this area separate Azerbaijan from 
Nakhchivan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the negotiation processes the Azerbaijan government      wants to connect these two 
parts   but Armenia has not agreed with this plan, and they do not want to give any land 
which between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.      
 
Source: www.michaeltotten.com
Figure 7. Map of Nakhchivan 
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 One of the main problems in the negotiation process is political. The Caucasian region 
always focuses on Russia and the West. Unfortunately now there is not a common position 
between superpowers about South Caucasus. In order to control Caspian oil and gas resources, 
the U.S tries to solve NK issue in a peaceful way. On the other hand Russia, as a successor of 
former USSR, always estimates that in the geopolitics concept Russia has to control South 
Caucasus or its “backyard”. Until 1995 Russia attempted to dominate the negotiation process. 
If the parties make an agreement, Russia wants to control peacekeeping operations in the 
region but after the “five days” war with Georgia in 2008 it seems Russia’s plan is dead. 
Especially after the “rose revolution” in Georgia, Russian influence doubled in the region and 
negotiation process. Before the revolution Georgia fully supported Russian policy but after 
the revolution Georgia stood fully opposed to Russian policy. Russia’s very last desire is to 
lose another “backyard” country and thus Russia is always making pressure to the negotiation 
process.  
 
  As we illustrate, the problems are different and as a parallel Azerbaijan and NK’s 
perceptions are also different. Despite Armenia’s claims that they do not have a territorial 
claim against Azerbaijan, in the current Armenian government key political players are from 
NK and inherently this has influenced Armenian perception to the negotiation process as well. 
In the negotiation process parties “status” and “Lachin corridor” perceptions are same as 
fifteen years ago. However during fifteen years in some points the parties have changed their 
perceptions positively. Azerbaijan’s main perception, that NK is autonomous only within 
Azerbaijan, is the same as fifteen years ago. Armenian’s position, that either NK is an 
independent state or part of Armenia, is also the same as fifteen years ago. In the below table 
we can see the main positions of the parties. 
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Table 3.  Position of the parties 
Inspired from Council of Europe’s reports.  
 
 
 
 
POSITION OF THE PARTIES 
Azerbaijan Armenia NK 
Armenia and NK must take 
out their military forces from 
original Azerbaijan areas 
without any provision 
Azerbaijan lost NK war and 
they have no legal right to 
make any claim 
NK would be independent or 
unified to Armenia not to 
Azerbaijan. 
Refugees and IDPs must 
return to their own territory 
Azerbaijan should recognize 
NK as a independent party in 
the negotiation process 
N-K is sovereign country and 
Azerbaijan and International 
organization should recognize its 
independence because N-K has (1) 
“a territory and (2) population as 
well as (3) elected, organized and 
functioning  
authorities and is (4) capable of 
assuming and fulfilling 
international obligations” 
Lachin corridor should be 
under the control of 
Azerbaijan 
Lachin corridor must be 
stand under the control of 
Armenian sovereignty but it 
will be compensated 
to Azerbaijan by equal 
territory from other parts of 
N-K; 
“The position of the N-K de 
facto authorities is largely 
identical with that of 
Armenia, as aptly symbolized 
by the flag” 
Azerbaijan will give NK the 
highest level of autonomy 
status within Azerbaijan 
Armenia has no territorial 
claim against Azerbaijan so 
Azerbaijan and Turkey 
should take over border 
blockade from Armenia 
 
If conflict is resolved under 
Azerbaijan’s conditions, 
Azerbaijan will recognize 
Armenian authority. 
If conflict is resolved 
occupied territories will 
returned to Azerbaijan.  
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3.2 Peace proposals by International Organizations and delaying factors in the 
negotiation process.  
 
 After the cease fire under the control of international organizations, especially the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the parties began to negotiate. As we 
mentioned above at that time also there were obstacles in the negotiation process and the 
parties themselves made some proposals but those proposals were absolutely rejected by both 
parties. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia needed proposals or peace plans which were created by 
a neutral country or organization. Then in 1992 during the meeting in Minsk (capital of 
Belarus) OSCE built a special division which will encourage Azerbaijan and Armenia to find 
a solution over the NK problem. The OSCE Minsk group, which is officially the mediator in 
this conflict, began to prepare a proposal or peace plan. On December 1994 during the 
Budapest summit co-chairmanship was established in Minsk group. 
  
 After the cease-fire in 1994 both countries’ economic situation was poor and millions 
of people came back from their homeland. The situation was very bad and both countries’ 
governments were trying to construct asylums for refugees and IDPs. From 1994 to 1996 
conflict was at a stalemate; the conflicting sides were busy rebuilding the economic system 
and stabilizing political mechanisms. Eventually in 1996-1997 the parties could stabilize their 
economic and political situation, and it was time to start real negotiations. 
  
 In order to tackle these problems and to make peace, during the Lisbon summit in July 
1997 the OSCE Minsk group introduced a comprehensive plan “Package option” to the 
parties. According to this plan, NK is an autonomic state within Azerbaijan. The proposal 
aimed to solve the status of NK or “status” issue within Azerbaijan. Furthermore the 
“Package option” also indicated solutions to the Lachin corridor problem. According to the 
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proposal, the Lachin corridor would be under control of OSCE supervision. Moreover, in 
order to facilitate refugees and IDPs return to their homeland, the OSCE, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia would have to protect refugee and IDP’s security. Although the proposal was good 
and credible it rejected by Armenian side because they did not agree with the status of NK 
within Azerbaijan. (Accord 2005).   
 
 After the “Package option”, the OSCE Minsk group did offer another comprehensive 
plan- “step by step”- in December of 1997. According to the “step by step” proposal Armenia 
has to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan territories (except Lachin region), and refugees 
and IDPs will come back to their homelands. Furthermore Azerbaijan and Turkey should 
open the borders with Armenia. In this plan the status of NK was not mentioned and it was 
left for the future. This plan aimed first to find a solution about border blockade, refugee and 
IDP then future to find solution to “status and Lachin” issue.  
 
 The proposal was accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia but NK did not accept the 
proposal because Azerbaijan did not recognize NK as a negotiating side, and they claimed 
that before the negotiation their independence and status should be guaranteed. Furthermore 
NK claimed that “step-by-step” plan did not encircle security issue in NK. Among all the 
plans or proposals, the “step by step” plan was the nearest one to the sides’ ambitions. (Crisis 
Group Europe report N:167, 2005) 
 
 In November of 1998, the OSCE offered another plan to the parties called the 
“common state” proposal. According to the plan, NK would have de facto independence 
(Accord, issue 17, 2005). The plan looks like a continuation of the “package option” with 
new modification. In the “package” plan define NK as a part of Azerbaijan but new plan 
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gives NK de facto independence. The other problem in this proposal is that the plan did not 
mention the Lachin corridor. The proposal was accepted by Armenia and NK but rejected by 
Azerbaijan because of de facto independence and according to proposal Sushi-the center city 
of NK- recognized as a part of NK which historically Sushi belongs to Azerbaijan. (Chufrin 
2001)  
 
 In 1999, the Armenian president made a new offer called “land swap” to Azerbaijan 
(Abbasov and Khachaturian 2002). According to the “land swap” proposal, Armenia offered 
the MEHRI area to Azerbaijan which connects Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and instead of it; 
they want the Lachin corridor which connects Armenia with NK. This plan would be good for 
Azerbaijan because Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan will connect and via Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan 
will have a direct connection with Turkey. In Armenia many groups stood against the 
president’s plan because if Armenia gives the MEHRI area to Azerbaijan, they will lose a 
direct connection with Iran, which is the only country with which Armenia has open borders. 
This plan rejected by Azerbaijan’s president during the “Key West” meetings in 2000. 
(Abasov and Khachaturian 2002) 
 
 Moreover, in 2000-2001, the OSCE introduced new proposals. The first proposal was 
introduced to the both side’s presidents (Heydar Aliyev was Azerbaijan president and Robert 
Kocharyan was Armenian president) when they met in Paris. The second proposals were 
offered in Key West, Florida in April 2001. Despite previous proposals these new proposals 
were secret and little information was released to public about the peace plan. The first 
proposal was called the “Paris principles”. In spite of the previous peace projects, these 
proposals did not estimate relations as hierarchical. According to secret Paris principles, NK 
would have its own Legislation, Executive and Judiciary branches which indicate that non 
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hierarchical relations would exist between NK and the conflicting states (JEMIE 2003). The 
parties did not sign any formal agreement, but despite the previous proposals parties agreed 
in some points, while the status of NK remained a deadlock point again. Azerbaijan insisted 
on territorial integrity, while on the other hand Armenia and NK persist in seeking “self-
determination”.  
 
 In 2003, the Azerbaijan people elected a new president-Ilham Aliyev. After coming to 
power he rejected the “package” plan and he tried to continue the negotiation process with 
“step-by-step” plan. At the beginning, the Armenian side did not agree with this policy. 
OSCE Co-chairmen-they are from France, Russia and U.S- initiate a meeting between the 
two countries’ foreign ministries and they were able to do it. This process was called the 
“Prague process”. According to the Azerbaijan government, at that time the Armenian 
government was settling Armenian people in occupied Azerbaijan territories. The Azerbaijan 
government brought up this issue in the U.N and they demand that the U.N send inspection 
groups in order to check the situation in occupied Azerbaijan territories. The U.N at first did 
not accept this idea, but they ordered this job to the OSCE. OSCE groups went to the 
occupied areas and they accused the Armenian government of settling Armenians in the 
occupied areas. (PA doc 10991, 2006) The Armenian government saw that the situation was 
not good for them and then they agreed with Azerbaijan’s new plan, in which they continued 
the negotiation process with a “step-by-step” plan. Like the previous processes, until now 
there has not been any tangible result with the “Prague process”. 
 
 In September of 2004, the Presidents of both sides met in Astana (capital of 
Kazakhstan) on the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) summit. (T. Huseynov 2005)  
In this summit different proposals were offered to the parties. According to these peace 
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projects, both parties have to withdraw their troops from Karabakh, both sides’ refugees and 
IDPs must return to their home lands and then a referendum should be held so people of NK 
should define in which country NK would belong  
(T. Huseynov 2005). This plan seems appropriate for each side, but like the last plans, there 
has been no result.  
 
 The OSCE Minsk group prepared a new plan in 2007 called the “Madrid Principles” 
(Accord 2005). According to this plan NK’s status will be determined by referendum. For this 
referendum, firstly both side’s all refugees and IDPs will return, then the referendum will 
held and that referendum will determine the status of NK. From 2007 until now, both parties 
have been working on the plan. In 2008 during the interview with a Russian TV channel, the 
new Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan argued that without definition of “status” no action 
would be happen because if IDP and refugees came back without identification of the status 
of NK "would cause new clashes." From his speech, we can assume that the last plan also 
will not give any fruit.  
  
 As we investigated, during the last fifteen years many negotiation processes were held 
but until now we cannot observe any possible solutions. Then one may ask, as some 
proposals were good and they were reflected parties interests, why there is no result? 
 
 However, both parties could make agreement on the past negotiations but they prefer 
to use time. Probably each side thought that time is in their side and they can change the 
situation to their side. In my opinion the Armenian side thought that, as they were a winner of 
the war, Azerbaijan will make a concession, but it did not happen. Then the negotiation 
process began to get deeper and deeper. On the other hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
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themselves have problems inside the countries. In some points like status of NK or in another 
issue, the Armenian and NK governments had different ambitions and the Armenian 
government always could not make pressure against the NK government. In some points of 
past negotiations, Armenia was ready to compromise with Azerbaijan but the NK government 
with assistance of the “Diaspora” put pressure on the Armenian government (Zolyan 2009). 
When the Armenian government accepted the “step by step” proposal, the NK government 
rejected it and they told the Armenian government and public that they are also Armenian and 
they lost many citizens in order to get NK. Sometimes NK and Armenian officials did not 
agree with each other for the status of NK. Now also there are these types of problems in 
Armenia and inherently it is one of the delaying factors in the negotiation process.  
 
 According to Jerayr Libaridyan (Accord 2005) during the Lisbon summit Azerbaijan 
used its “oil card”. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan has huge natural resources like oil and gas. In 
1996 Azerbaijan signed an oil treaty- “treaty of century”- with U.S, U.K, Russia, Japan and 
so forth. Then the Azerbaijan government believed that with the new weapon-oil-they can 
induce to force Armenia accepted NK as a part of Azerbaijan. As a result of both countries’ 
challenges, the “package option” was dead. Countries’ mistaken opinion found a long 
incompatibility on the issue of status.  
   
 In 1998, the Armenian president Ter-Petrosian resigned, and the new president Robert 
Kocharian, who was a former president of NK, came to power. Under the new government 
Armenia’s political system changed and inherently it influenced the negotiation process. The 
new government proclaims that there is one way for the resolution-either NK will be an 
independent area or unified to Armenia so due to this political change, the “step by step” 
proposal is also dead and negotiations delayed. 
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 In 2006, the de facto NK government made a constitutional referendum in order to 
proclaim NK as a sovereign state. After the referendum NK officials announced that 98 
percent citizens participated in the referendum and it showed that NK is a sovereign state. But 
inherently this referendum was rejected by OSCE and EU because NK Azeries did not 
participate in the referendum. These types of event also increased hostility between the two 
states and it has delayed the negotiation process. 2007 and 2008 were election years for both 
countries, and there were elections in Russia and the U.S as well.  
  
    Consequently, from our investigation, we can easily observe that both parties have 
almost the same interests like returning refugees and IDPs or securing NK and so forth but 
rather to participate with same interest parties are participating with position. It seems that 
under these circumstances it is hard to solve the problem and NK still remains as a big 
problem not for only Caucasia but also for the international arena.  
 
 In fact, despite the lack of desire of “Super powers”, the parties sometimes talk that a 
second war is possible in this conflict. But reality is different because the new global world is 
totally different than during the 1992 NK war. States now do not use army or weapon against 
each other now they are using economic power more than military power. Also “super 
powers” do not desire any war to occur without their control. On the other hand, the U.N and 
E.U also are sensitive about NK conflict and if any sides initiate war they will face hard U.N 
or E.U sanctions. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia know this so now this idea seems that states 
are using the possibility of war only to intimidate each other. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MEDIATION PROCESSES IN THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON RESOLUTION. 
 
  In general, during the twentieth century many conflicts occurred. Some of them have 
already been solved but others are still remaining like two Transcaucasian conflicts, Georgia 
and South Ossetia as well as the NK conflict-, which could not be solved over sixteen years. 
Compared to other conflict regions, such as former Yugoslavia, Transcaucasia is small and 
then one may ask why finding a resolution is not possible in this region. In order to find this 
question’s answer and other dark points of mediation processes this chapter analyzes the 
potential mediators, their interests, and the shortages or problems of the mediation processes.       
 
4.1 Mediators in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict.  
 
  Generally when conflict becomes a desperate situation, in order to win parties persist 
for a long time and they reject all attempts to resolve the conflict; this type of conflict is 
called an “intractable conflict” (Coleman 2006). According to Charles King, Jan Eliosson and 
other scholars, the NK conflict is one of the most intractable conflicts in Eurasia. From 
parties’ interests and positions covered in the previous chapter, we can easily observe that 
these claims are true. In intractable conflict, there are three potential mediators: 1. Individuals 
2. States and 3. Institutions and organizations (Bercowitch 1992).  
 
As a state, Turkey, Iran, Russia and other countries are mediators in the conflict. 
Regional powers like Russia, Iran, Turkey and Kazakhstan were the first countries which 
attempted to intervene in the conflict during 1991-1993, but due to the disputant’s 
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intractability as well as the interveners’ biased positions, initial attempts were not so effective. 
It seems at that time both disputants were not aware of the “cost” and “risk” of the war.  
 
In 1991, the Russian president Boris Yeltsin and the Kazakhstan president Nursultan 
Nazarbayev first attempted to settle the conflict. However, due to internal problems, like 
privatization processes or to failure to get control all over the country, in Russia and 
Kazakhstan both presidents could not engage effectively to the NK conflict. According to 
Mooradian and Druckman (1999) when the two presidents made a plan for intervention, 
neither the Russian nor the Kazakhstan presidents thought about NK’s fate, they simply had 
some personal ambitions. After the unsuccessful attempt, in the same year Iran made efforts 
to find a resolution for the NK dispute. Generally like Russia, historically Iran also has a 
connection with both countries, as especially during nineteenth century many Armenians 
came from Iran to current Armenia but until now their ties are remaining with Iran. On the 
other hand, in northern Iran more than fifteen million Azerbaijanis are living. On February 26, 
1992 right after the Khojali massacre, Azerbaijan and Armenia started to negotiate under the 
auspices of Iran but the next day the Armenian army occupied another Azerbaijani city, Susha. 
Negotiations broke down and Azerbaijan accused Iran for selling weapons to Armenia. So 
Iran’s mediation effort also failed (Drobizheva, Walker 1996). In the same year after Iran’s 
initiation, Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev attempted again to find solution but 
the Armenian side claimed that Nazarbayev’s position was biased and that he supported the 
Azerbaijan side thus they rejected Nazarbajev’s mediation initiation (Mooradian 1999).   
 
Besides states in the international dispute there are some global and regional 
organizations like the U.N or “The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe” 
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(hereafter OSCE12) which have the basic institutional objective of the settlement of disputes 
(Merrils 2005). Until 1992 the U.N, international and regional organizations did not initiate 
effectively to settle the dispute. When the Khojali massacre occurred in 1992, the conflict 
immediately came into the international agenda and firstly the U.N appointed CSCE as an 
official mediator in the dispute. After the invasion of Khalbajer city by Armenian and NK 
troops, the U.N accepted four resolutions which condemned the Armenian invasions. 
(Appendix)  
 
In March 1992, right after the massacre, the CSCE Council of Ministers urgently 
congregated in Helsinki, and the organization decided to make a conference in order to stop 
the war. In the same year eleven states13, CSCE members gathered in the capital city of 
Belarus-Minsk (European Report N°167, 2005). They formed a special group-CSCE Minsk 
Group- for the conflict resolution. During the Budapest summit in 1994, in order to beef up 
the negotiation and mediation process CSCE created a so called “co-chairmanship” of Minsk 
group “…to name co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference to ensure a common and agreed 
basis for negotiations and to realize full co-ordination in all mediation and negotiation 
activities” (Budapest document 1994). In the first period Russia and Sweden noted that they 
are ready to serve as co-chairs voluntarily and in 1995 Sweden was replaced by Finland. 
After two years Finland canceled its co-chair mission in the Minsk group and then, instead of 
the empty Finland position, a French ambassador was appointed. Azerbaijan expressed 
dissatisfaction about this displacement and they offered the U.S representative instead of the 
French representative and finally the U.S entered in the “co-chairmanship” as a third co-chair 
(Baser 2008). From that time –U.S, Russia and France are the official co-chairmen in the 
                                          
12 Until 1995, OSCE have called as Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).   
13 Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Russia, U.S., Turkey, France, Czechoslovakia and Sweden. 
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conflict. As we discussed in the last chapter, these co-chairmen have presented three 
proposals until now.   
 
As a regional organization “Commonwealth Independent States” (hereafter CIS) is 
also another mediator. In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated and after one-year, the former 
Soviet countries founded CIS, and only former USSR countries were allowed to participate in 
this organization. As former Soviet countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia accepted membership 
in CIS in May 1992. CIS also offered a solution proposal to the parties.   
   
  Altogether these organizations are active mediators in any dispute, but there are some 
non-governmental organizations like the “International Committee of the Red Cross” (ICRC) 
that in certain situations can act as a mediator (Merrills 1998). Especially in the current 
situation-“no war, no peace”- from time to time action happened in the front-line and in order 
to give back captive soldiers the ICRS or Red Crescent had to act as a mediator.    
 
4.2 Why and When Mediation? 
 
            In general mediation only can take place with both parties’ consent. Then one can ask 
when and why parties need mediation?  
 
             In the war situation, at the beginning of war most parties do not agree for mediation 
and they often reject mediation. Especially in the case of historical or religious hatreds 
between states, that is a very hard situation to persuade parties for mediation and mostly they 
reject any mediation effort like the NK conflict or the Indian-Pakistan war over Kashmir. In 
the NK case, there are historical hatreds between states. On the other hand, during the 
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beginning of the war Armenian and NK Armenians side was seeking to get NK or join it to 
Armenia while the Azerbaijan side aimed to prevent possible Armenian and NK attacks 
against its own land and to regain NK. That is why some countries and organizations’ 
mediation efforts failed during 1991-1993.  
 
Moreover in order to get more benefits, a powerful country often rejects the offer of 
mediation (Rangarajan 1985). During 1991-1992 countries like Iran and Kazakhstan offered 
mediation for the conflict but both proposals were rejected by Armenia. One of the reasons 
for the rejection was that the Armenia-NK axis was the more powerful side in the conflict and 
at that time they knew that they could get NK and other Azerbaijani lands. Another main 
cause for the rejection of mediation is “sovereignty” and “nationalism” (Rangarajan 1985). In 
the case of the NK war, because of the undefined history and confusion by USSR’s policy 
makers, both countries perceived that NK is their own land and they have to protect their 
sovereignty.  
 
 However, there is a border of rejection. When neither side can continue war or can 
impose a solution unilaterally, they agree for mediation (Merrils 1998). In the NK war during 
1994 Armenia began to lose power and consecutively they did poorly in a couple of battles. 
Although Azerbaijan won some battles at that time, the economic and political situation was 
unstable inside the country and political leaders could not make an agreement with each other 
inside Azerbaijan. Both countries were able to realize the “risk” and “cost” of the war and 
they conceived that continuing war is dangerous so they need mediation and negotiation. 
Eventually, in May of 1994, the countries made a cease-fire and approved mediation.  
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4.3 Interests (motives) of mediators.  
 
As we analyzed above, until 1994 all mediation efforts failed and from 1994 to 1998 
several proposals were offered to both parties but again two major issues (status of NK and 
the Lachin corridor) was leading the negotiation process and they came as main problems for 
the mediation process as well.  
 
Generally, we can categorize several problems and shortcomings in the mediation 
process. Let us start with external actors’ interests in the mediation process. As we examine, 
there are two types of mediator in the NK conflict. The first is states like Russia, Turkey, Iran 
and the second consists of regional or international organizations like CIS and OSCE. 
According to Zartman and Touval (1985), when states aim to mediate conflict, they have 
some “motives” and these motives are changeable from large state to small state. Broadly, 
“states may have defensive or offensive motives for mediation” (Zartman and Touval 1985). 
When states have “defensive motive” they try to eliminate other states intervention to certain 
region and they attempt to not give them opportunities to expand in certain areas and also 
make stability to create a controlling opportunity for themselves. However in “offensive 
motive” states aim to expand their power into a certain region or area and to build 
relationship with disputants (Zartman and Touval 1985).  
 
In this case, Russia seems to have both “defensive and offensive motives” for the 
mediation in the NK conflict. Russia, as the biggest country in the region and as well as a 
major player in the world, tries to keep itself as an influential power or “elder brother” in this 
conflict. After the disintegration of USSR, because of huge natural resources and geopolitical 
importance Russia did not abdicate from Transcaucasia. In order to control the region Russia 
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is playing as a main peacekeeping actor in the conflict (Betts 1999). According to Baser 
(2008), after the ruination of the USSR, Russia’s peacekeeping initiations created more 
problems rather than solutions. In the negotiation processes, Russia tried to build military 
bases in both countries as this way the Kremlin knew that in the future no disputant could 
challenge against it. On the one hand, Russia planned that through these army bases Kremlin 
could control oil pipelines and would not let Armenia and NK slip through its fingers. 
Eventually this policy almost damaged all of “Russia's reputation as the impartial and just 
mediator interested in solving the problem” (Baser 2008). Instead of Russian army bases, 
Azerbaijan preferred to build a relationship with NATO via Turkey because it is sustainable 
for the country. In addition, Azerbaijan and Georgia first participated in “CIS mutual security 
treaty” but then both countries showed that they do not plan to participate in “CIS mutual 
security treaty” anymore and it was such as a signal that country is behaving independently 
from the Kremlin (Svante 2001).  Russia’s other interest in the mediation process is to 
prevent possible NATO and Western countries expansion into the region via Turkey 
(Chorbajian 1994) so as we mentioned Russia always want to control its backyard.  
 
  In conflict situations, some states offer mediation in order to prevent permeation of 
the conflict into their country or other regions (Betts 1999). In the beginning of the conflict 
the U.S, E.C, and other Western powers did not intervene to the conflict because at that time 
USSR did not collapse or “it was end of Cold War” so that was risky, especially for the U.S. 
On the other hand, E.C was busy with the Yugoslavia problem and they could not deal with 
the NK conflict (Baser 2008). Then the conflict began to get more dangerous especially when 
Turkey and Iran tried to intervene or to make mediation. Turkey was involved for reasons 
such as the ethnic or historical relationship with Azerbaijan and most importantly to stabilize 
the region so Turkey could traverse the oil pipeline from Turkey, for which Ankara was 
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competing with Russia (Betts 1999). “"Although [Turkey's] geopolitical interests in the post-
Soviet republics were framed primarily in terms of its desire to expand Turkish influence, a 
strong security element also pervaded Ankara's thinking. Central to Turkish concerns was the 
prospect of nationalist strife in areas adjacent to its borders" (Croissant, 1998).   
 
Conversely, Iran was worried about the expansion of war inside the country because 
more than fifteen million ethnic Azeri was living in northern Iran. In addition, Iran’s aim was 
to build a relationship with the former USSR’s Muslim countries. Eventually, in order to 
prevent the expansion of conflict and balance Russian role in the conflict, in 1993 under the 
auspices of CSCE some Western countries and the U.S were involved in a mediation attempt 
(Betts 1999). However, the U.S and E.C countries intervention via CSCE may have prevented 
possible Turkey, Iran and Russia confrontation but at the same time, this invention created 
other counteraction, namely the Russia-OSCE. Especially during 1993, despite membership 
of CSCE, Russia was acting alone and offered some proposals without counseling with 
OSCE. When OSCE recommended arranging peacekeeping troops in the conflict zone, 
Russia attempted to place more troops than other states and inherently OSCE did not agree 
with this idea (Baser 2008). The Russian and CSCE clash made dissatisfaction for parties and 
Armenian president Ter Petrosyan noted his frustration “mediating countries and international 
organizations are not interested so much in settling the conflict, as in settling their own 
accounts and relationships, which are unconnected with it” (De Waal 2004).  
 
 According to Betts (1999) despite states interests, international organizations have 
totally different motives in order to make meditation efforts to conflict. “Peacekeeping” is the 
main aim of many international organizations and “is often included in their charters”. In 
general, when international or regional organizations attempt to make mediation efforts they 
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seek to increase their position in dispute and “defend their reputations as effective 
peacemakers”. In addition, in some case organizations intervene to conflict in order to 
“alleviate the humanitarian crisis” (Betts 1999). In 1992, OSCE made a decision to intervene 
in the NK conflict. OSCE’s decision was not only to cease the humanitarian crisis but also to 
gain “to gain more reputation in the eyes of the international community post the Bosnia 
debacle” (Baser 2008). In OSCE, the Minsk group contains eleven members with different 
interests. As we discussed above in the co-chairmanship there are three countries-U.S, Russia 
and France.       
 
  Finally, from the above scenario we can easily see that in the conflict, each mediator 
has its own interest and in order to gain their interests in the negotiation table they struggle 
with each other rather than to make agreement.  For oil or geopolitical importance, the 
mediators’ interests are almost remain the same and it is delaying the peace process in 
Transcaucasia.  
     
 
4.4 Defects of third party mediation in the peace process. 
 
  According to Zartman and Touval there are three types of roles of mediators: 1. 
Communicator, 2. Formulator and 3 Manipulator. In some conflicts based on historical 
hatreds or fearing to lose there is no communication between the disputants. In this case, in 
order to make communication the mediator serves as a communicator. On the other hand, in 
order to make settlement as a formulator, mediator should be capable to offer different 
proposals to belligerents. In the last case as a manipulator mediator could use “power” for the 
resolution (Zartman and Touval 1996). In the NK dispute, mediators are successful as a 
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communicator but they are lack of formulation and manipulation capacity (Baser 2008). As 
we discussed in previous chapters until now as mediators Iran, Russia, the OSCE and CIS 
have offered some proposals to disputants but there is not yet sustainable settlement result 
and on these grounds we can assume that the mediator cannot maneuver parties from a “zero-
sum” situation to “win-win” condition as they do not have enough manipulation and 
formulation capability.  
 
   According to Kleiboer (1998) for mediators, “leverage” is necessary especially when  
conflicting parties attempt dominate one to another. Nevertheless, a mediator cannot  
use “leverage” in all conflicts. The essence is that, in order to use “leverage” the   
mediator should be accepted by all parties in all stages of mediation processes. In the  
case of NK, to make “extraction” is hard. In order to make “extraction” in the NK  
conflict, both sides should be ready to sacrifice some of their claims. For instance, the  Azerb
aijan side should recognize some claims of Karabakh Armenians and at the same time, Karab
akh Armenians should give back Azerbaijan’s areas. Mediators do not have “extraction” abilit
y in the NK issue and without the ability to use extraction; the mediators were unable to 
perform the essential role of formulation and creative problem solving” (Betts 1999).  
 
  Another main problem in NK mediation is “timing” because the mediator estimates 
that parties do not intend to make an agreement, in reality parties are trying to solve the 
problem with offensive way (Baser 2008)  
 
The last and main problem in the conflict is neutrality. In general, in any conflict, 
resolution parties should be unbiased and they have to keep aside their interests from the 
mediation process. On the other hand, mediators must attend to both parties equally (Gibson, 
  
  52 
 
Thompson, and Bazerman (1996). In the NK case, as we examined above, each country has 
its own interests on his agenda and they are acting for their agenda. “Mediators must speak 
with one voice and be able to make credible threats and promises," (Brown 1996). However 
in the OSCE Minsk group, there are eleven countries and these countries act in order to their 
own separate agendas rather than acting collectively.  Especially, it is obvious that, for 
centuries, the Russian and U.S relationship is not good and these countries are trying to 
challenge each other. These countries are participating in the co-chairmanship office of the 
OSCE Minsk group and so we can understand that as in many cases, the U.S and Russian 
challenge also happens in the NK case and “neutrality” is questionable in the conflict 
mediation process. 
 
Figure 8. Interests of Mediators.  
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 Consequently, although this analysis is not enough to investigate all of the mediation 
processes and problems, we addressed the questions on mediation shortages and problems 
and why a solution for the conflict is not possible until now. According to our observation, in 
the first years of the conflict, no country attempted to intervene or mediate the dispute and 
then more than eleven countries with different interests appeared on the negotiation table as a 
mediator. Each country had their own interests, which are not necessarily related one to 
another and even they are not thinking about negotiation parties’ interests. This situation 
creates other problems like neutrality. In addition, mediators’ lack formulation and 
manipulation skills demonstrate the problem of “timing”. Throughout this analysis we 
learned that mediation is a process which attempts to settle conflict, but in the NK conflict, 
the mediators themselves are struggling with each other to get more benefit or power from 
the region, rather than finding a solution for the region.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
     
          The “no war-no peace” situation remains the same as fourteen years ago. This means 
that under this condition, instead of getting more economic benefits from the region, both 
countries are now facing economic problems and inherently it influences their political 
system as well. 
 
  Both parties are looking at the past and they continue to blame each other on the 
grounds of history, so inherently they are not interested in the negotiation processes. 
Continually reflecting on the fourth century AD or early twentieth century is making the 
conflict worse, as opposed to finding a solution. On the other hand, standing at the 
negotiation table with these positions does not give anything except a stalemate, and day by 
day this deadlock situation is breaking the hope of refugees and IDPs to return to their 
homeland. 
  
 Moreover, the negotiation processes have been prolonged and occasionally the 
Azerbaijani government appears to understand that, inasmuch as Azerbaijan’s last chance to 
regain NK is war. However, this could be simply intimidation due to the last five days war 
(Russia-Georgia 2008) in the region. Russia invaded Georgia at the expense of violation of 
international law. The Kremlin did not do it simply to protect South Ossetia, but rather acted 
out of some type of defiance to Transcaucasia. The last action of Russia demonstrated that 
Moscow is keen on every process in the region and any war between two countries will be 
responded to by Russia. Therefore it seems that there is no possibility of war in the conflict, 
but at the same time under the current mediation processes there is no possible solution as 
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well. In this context, democratic countries 14  cannot make a great deal because some 
undemocratic countries, like Russia or Iran, creates problems. Under this condition, 
responsibility for conflict resolution must be relieved by both Azerbaijan and Armenia.  
 
     Currently, both Azerbaijan and Armenian’s position is not satisfactory. In order to 
settle conflict in a peaceful way both sides should respect each side’s interests. However, 
currently in NK conflict neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia regard opponent’s interests. They 
only regard their own interests. They have to make mutual compromise like European 
countries did it last century. In late twenties century there were many territorial conflicts 
between European countries like French-German, Poland-German, Romania-Hungry etc. 
However, in the second half of the century European countries solved these conflicts with 
mutual compromise. They simple lose borders and began to unify. Now, Caucasian countries 
like Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia need this type of cooperation. If three Transcaucasian 
countries lose internal borders-they can keep only external borders like EU- it will not only 
resolve conflicts in the region -Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia etc-but also region’s 
economic situation will develop. 
 
    On the other hand, some scholars like Bogdani, Loughlin and others recommend that 
Kosovo conflict resolution model is applicable to NK conflict. However, in my opinion it is 
not a good option for NK conflict. Firstly, Kosovo build as a state with the right of self 
determination-external. There are two types of self determination: internal and external. For 
communities that are colonized and are not within existing states they could get external self-
determination which happened in Kosovo (Borgen 2009). This principle-external self-
determination-is not applicable to NK conflict because NK was within existing state-
                                          
14 U.S, EU, Turkey 
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Azerbaijan. If state allow minority group to speak and get education in their own language 
and to practice their own culture and participate in political arena effectively that is internal 
self-determination (Borgen 2008) which is applicable to Nagorno Karabakah and Azerbaijan 
government also announced that if NK will join to Azerbaijan, government ensure them that 
they will allowed to speak and get education in their own language and to practice their 
culture in a meaningful way and participate in political arena effectively. In Kosovo case their 
rights was strongly violated by Serbs and they were massacred by Serb army and according 
to Borgen if state violate minorities’ rights and there are not any remedy under domestic and 
international law communities they can use self-determination right (Borgen 2008) so in this 
case Kosovo used self-determination right correctly. However, it is not the case in NK 
conflict. During USSR and after it there were no any human right violations against NK 
Armenians.  
 
     Moreover, if one or same ethnic group live together in a certain area they can use self-
determination right. In Kosovo there is only one ethnic group or people-all of Kosovo people 
are ethnic Albanian. In Nagorno Karabkah there are more than two ethnic groups-Armenian 
and Azerbaijanis, Kurds etc.  ` 
 
    Instead of Kosovo model I recommend Aland Island conflict resolution model to NK 
conflict. Aland Island is an island between Sweden and Finland and it consists of more than 
6000 small islands and its total area is about 13,512 km2 (Vesa 2008). Until now three 
different countries controlled Aland Islands-Swedish (1157-1809), Russia (1809-1917) and 
Finland (1917-to present) (Barros 1968). Like NK conflict Aland Island conflict also began 
on the ground of history. Both Finland and Sweden claimed that historically Aland Island 
belong them. During eighteens century island’s control pass between Russia and Sweden. 
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After 1809 Finland was colonized by Russian empire and at that time Aland island was an 
autonomous territory of Finland.  In 1917 Finland gained independence from Russian empire 
and Finland officially demanded that Aland Island should unify with Finland. At the same 
time Sweden also demand that Island should annexed to Sweden. Sweden government 
proposed that principle of self-determination should be applied to Alanders. However, 
Finland was opposed to that idea because Finland claimed that Alanders are composed only 
small part of “Finland’s Swedish speaking people” (Barros 1968). Then during Paris Peace 
Conference (1919) European powers like England, France and U.S delegations tried to solve 
problem in a peaceful way but they could not do it because there was big disagreement 
between Sweden and Finland about the status of the Island. After the Paris peace conference 
France and England came to the conclusion that the conflict should be resolved within 
League of Nations. In order to settle the conflict League founded two commissions. Firstly, 
League established Commission of Jurists and in 1920 commission announced their decision-
their decision was in favor of Sweden. Then League established Commission of Inquiry.  
After a comprehensive investigation of the conflict, commission came to decision that for 
some reasons Aland should be within Finland. Commission of Inquiry noted that firstly, 
geographically island seemed as a mainland of Finland. Secondly, politically from 1809 
Island was part of Finland and even before when Finland was under Swedish authority Aland 
Island was one of the provinces of Finland. Commission noted that, there is no need to 
plebiscite: “minority - fractions of a population - in a state had no absolute right of separating 
itself from a state in order to be incorporated in another state or to declare its independence; 
the self-determination formula had to be applied “in a reasonable manner between a minority 
and the state” (Vesa 2008). Also Comission noted that minority need international protection. 
Consequently League of Nation noted that due to above reasons Aland Island should belong 
to Finland and Sweden government also regard commission’s decision. After commission’s 
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desicion in order to guarantee minority’s rights Finland and Sweden made an agreement: 
1) The teaching language in Åland schools in Swedish; 
2) Right of owning land in Åland is reserved to the Ålanders themselves; 
3) The right of voting in local elections and to the Åland parliament is reserved to the resident 
populations who have the right of domicile on the islands; 
4) Only a person accepted by the Ålanders themselves can be appointed County Governor, 
that is, the highest representative of the government of Finland in Åland (Vesa 2008).  
 
    I briefly explain Aland Island model above and the question is that:  Why not NK?  
Now, both Azerbaijan and Armenia should be avoid to complicate the conflcit. Azerbaijan 
take territorial integrity princip and Armenia self-determination. As we observed in Aland 
conflcit both Finland and Sweden’s position almost was same as NK. If League of Nation 
could solve the Aland conflcit, UN also can solve NK conflcit even UN does not need to 
establish new commissions for NK conflcit because there is already OSCE which is 
responsible to solve NK conflict. Firstly, UN should reform OSCE members because there 
are still bias members inside OSCE.  Then both Azerbaijan and Armenia should leave conflcit 
to OSCE. I strongly believe that if conflict left to unbiased OSCE, it can be solved. 
Azerbaijan and Armenia also can make an agreement to guarantee NK Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis rights. The language, culture and political rights could be same as Finland-
Sweden agreement. If Azerbaijan and Armenia make an agreement like Finland and Sweden 
it will derive a balance between competing claims and meet all the vital inetrests: 
Azerbaijan’s sovreignty, Armenian’s security, as well as NK people’s rights and identity.   
   
      This study shows that there are two main reasons of the failure of NK negotiations: 
mistrust between Azerbaijan and Armenia and international interests. In order to tackle these 
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issues firstly both countries should try to change in mentality. People of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia are looking to each other as an enemy and media and political parties of both 
countries are demonize each other in every day so under this condition it does not seem 
possible to solve problem easily. In order to build confidence and guarantee sustainable peace 
both governments have to facilitate public acceptance of the settlement. Political leaders of 
both sides should eliminate the idea of revenge and look at each other as an equal. 
Government of both countries should allow NK people to participate in negotiation process.       
 
     On the other hand, mediators, especially Russia and U.S, should change their strategy. 
U.S and Russian policies toward to NK conflict does not seem pragmatic or positive because 
in order to dominate oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan, mediators are exploiting the conflict 
and result of it there is no peace in the region since 1990th.  Mediators should analyze roots of 
the conflict and understand that why parties do not accept their proposals. They have to create 
an appropriate environment for conflict settlement and prepare a proposal which contains 
both self-determination and territorial integrity. Lastly, as mentioned above, change in 
mentality of both parties and international organization is important to solve NK conflict in a 
peaceful way. Otherwise, current stalemate will remain as before and the conflict can not be 
solved in a peaceful way.   
 
 
 Many have called the twenty-first century a democratic age, and in such an age, no 
conflict can be resolved by war or other bloody way. The democratic age demands that any 
conflict must be resolved via negotiation or other peaceful methods. The last four years war’s 
(1990-1994) balance sheet shows more than thirty thousand casualties and more than one 
million refugees and IDPs, and so both countries are unable to bear war again. This study 
hopes and believes that the NK conflict will be resolved in a peaceful way.  
  
  60 
 
 
BIOGRAPHY 
 
1. Abbasov Ali and Haroutiun Khachaturian. Variants for a solution of the Karabakh 
conflict: Baku: 2002. Print. 
2. Alexei Zverev,  Contested Borders In The Caucasus,  Bruno Coppieters; 1996 
 
3. Barros, James: The Aland Island Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations. 
New haven and London: Yale University Press. 1968 
  
4. Baser, Bahar. Third Party Mediation in Nagorno Karabakh: Part of the Cure or Part of 
the Disease? Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, 2008. 
 
 
5. Baguirov, Adil. "Nagorno-Karabakh: Basis and Reality of Soviet-era Legal and 
Economic Claims Used to Justify the Armenia-Azerbaijan War." Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs ; Vol.2(1) (2008) 
 
6. Bercovitch, Jacob. "Mediators and Mediation Strategies in International 
Negotiations." Negotiation Journal, 8 (1992): 99-112 
 
 
7. Betts, Wendy. Third Party Mediation: an Obstacle to Peace in Nagorno Karabakh, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999 
 
8. Bournoutian, George A. Armenians and Russia, 1626-1796 A Documentary Record 
(Armenian Studies Series, No. 2). New York: Mazda, 2001. Print 
 
 
9. Borgen, Christopher J. Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession. Self-Determination and 
Conflict Resolution. 2008   
 
  
  61 
 
10. Brown, Michael Edward, Oven R. Coté, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT, 2001. Print 
 
 
11. Brown, Michael E. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT, 1996. Print 
 
12. Cheterian, Vicken. War and Peace in the Caucasus ethnic conflict and the new 
geopolitics.  New York: Columbia University, 2009  
 
13. Christopher J, Walker. The Armenian Presence in Mountainous Karabkh in John F. 
Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schofield, Transcaucasian Boundaries , 
London: UCL Press,1996.  
 
 
14. Chufrin, Gennadii Illarionovich. The Security of the Caspian Sea Region Oxford UP, 
2001. Print 
 
15. Claude, Mutafian:  Karabagh in the Twentieth Century. in Levon Chorbajian, Patrick  
Donabedian. London, Zed, 1994. 
 
16. Croissant, Michael P. Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict causes and implications. Westport, 
Conn: Praeger, 1998. Print. 
 
17. CSCE- Towards A Genuine Partnership In A New ERA. Budapest Document 
(DOC.RC/1/95), 1994 
 
18. Daniel Druckman  and Moorad Mooradian Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The 
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Journal of peace research. George Mason 
University 1999 
 
19. Deutsch Morton, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric Colton. Marcus. The Handbook of 
Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 
Print. 
  
  62 
 
 
20. De, Waal Thomas. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. 
New York: New York UP, 2004. Print 
 
21. Erich Feigl, Un Mythe de la Terreur—Le Terrorisme Arménien, ses Origines et ses 
Causes, Salzburg: Druckhaus Nonntal, 1991 
 
22. George A. Bournoutian, ”The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition 
of     Eastern Armenia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century”  in Transcaucasia, 
Nationalism and Social Change : Essays in the history of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. University of Michigan Press, 1996 
 
23. Gibson, K. Thompson, L. and Bazerman, M.H. Shortcomings of Neutrality in 
Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality. Negotiation Journal, 12(1), 69-80, 1996 
 
24. Goldenberg Suzanne. Pride of Small Nation;. The Caucasus and the Post-Soviet 
Disorder. London, Zed, 1994 
 
25. Helsinki Watch/Memorial Report: Conflict in the Soviet Union: Black January in 
Azerbaijan. New York , May 1991.  
 
26. Hewsen H, Robert. Ashkharhatsoyts (Classical Armenian Texts), Caravan Books 
(December 1994).  
 
27. Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California, 2000. Print. 
 
28. Human Rights Watch: Azerbaijan-Seven years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. 
Helsinki, 1992 
 
29. Human Rights Watch: Escalation of Armed Conflict in Nagornno Karabakh. Helsinki, 
1992 
 
  
  63 
 
30. IOM-International Organization for Migration: Migration in the CIS in 1997-1998. 
1999 Edition 
 
31. ICG-International Crisis Group. Nagorno Karabakh-A plan for peace. Europe Report 
N°167, 2005 
 
32. Joireman, Sandra Fullerton. Nationalism and Political Identity. London: Continuum, 
2003. Print. 
 
33. JEMIE: Journal on Ethno politics Minority Issues in Europe . "The Territory-Identity 
Nexus in the Conflict over Nagorno    Karabakh: Implications for OSCE Peace 
Efforts." Nadia Milanova, 2 (2003): 13-16 
 
34. Kleiboer, Marieke. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation. Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998. 
 
35. Lake, David A. and Donald S. Rothchild. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: 
Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Preton UP, 1998. Print. 
 
36. Mammadova Havva. Khodjaly; martyrs and witnesses: Armenian terrorism as an 
integral part of international one, House of Tales, Baku 2006 
 
37. Merrills, J.G. International Dispute Settlement. Cambridge UP, 2005. 
 
38. Michael Zolyan. "Karabakh 2014." Accord (2009): 48-54. Web. <http://http://www.c-
r org/our work/caucasus/documents/Karabakh_2014_web_final_english_Sept09_pdf 
 
39. Moorad Mooradian and Daniel Druckman, Hurting Stalemate or Mediation, The 
conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, 1990-95, 36 Journal of Peace Research 6, 709, 1999 
 
 
40. Noble, John, Michael Kohn, and Danielle Systermans. Georgia, Armenia & 
Azerbaijan. Footscray (Vic.): Lonely Planet, 2008 
 
  
  64 
 
41. PA: Parliament Assembly. Illegal Settlement of Armenians in the occupied territories 
of Azerbaijan by Armenia as a gross violation of the principles of international law. 
Europe, 2006 
 
 
42.  Pustilnik Marina. “Caucasian Stresses”, in Transition, 15 March 1995 
 
43. Pruitt, Dean. G., & Kim, S. H. Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement 
(3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 2004 
 
44. Rangarajan, L.N. The Limitation of Conflict: a Theory of Bargaining and Negotiation. 
London: Croom Helm, 1985 
 
45. Svante E. Cornell. The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, Report no. 46, Department of 
East European Studies, Uppsala University, 1999 
 
46. Svante E. Cornell.  Small nations and great powers a study of ethno political conflict 
in the Caucasus. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon, 2001. Print    
 
47. Svante E. Cornell. Conflict Theory and the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: Guidelines 
for a Political Solution?” Triton Publishers, Stockholm Sweden, printed in Turkey, 
1997 
 
48. Tabib Huseyinov. Mountainous Karabakh: Conflict Resolution through Power- 
sharing and Regional Integration”.Accord issue 17, 2005    
 
49.  The Charter of the United Nations  1945: Chapter three, 1945.  
 
50. Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan a Borderland in Transition, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1995.  
 
51. Touval, Saadia. and I. William Zartman. International Mediation in Theory and 
Practice, Boulder: Westview, 1985. 
 
  
  65 
 
52. UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, Country-Azerbaijan, 2005. 
 
 
53. UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, Country-Armenia, 2005 
 
54. Vesa, Unto.  The Aland Island As a Conflcit resolution Mode. Leuven 2008 
 
55. Wimmer, Andreas. Facing Ethnic Conflicts: toward a New Realism. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004 
 
56. Ziya Bunyadov, Niyə Sumqayıt? (Why Sumgait?), Azərbaycan Elmlər Akademiyası, 
Elm jurnalı, 13 may 1988 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  66 
 
APPENDIX  A 
 
UN Resolution Act: N-822 
Calls for the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of occupying forces from Kelbajar 
district of Azerbaijan following its occupation on April 3, 1993 
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Source:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/247/71/IMG/N9324771.pdf?OpenElement 
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APPENDIX B 
UN Resolution Act: N-853 
Calls on withdrawal of occupying forces from Agdam district of Azerbaijan occupied on 
June 23, 1993 and reaffirms UN Resolution 822 
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Source:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/428/34/IMG/N9342834.pdf?OpenElement 
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APPENDIX C 
UN Resolution Act: N-874 
Calls on withdrawal of occupying forces from recently occupied Azerbaijani districts of 
Fizuli (August 23, 1993), Jabrayil (August 26, 1993), Qubadli (September 31, 1993) and 
reaffirms UN Resolutions 822 and 853. 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS                                                                                S 
Security Council 
Distr. 
GENERAL 
S/RES/874 (1993) 
14 October 1993 
RESOLUTION 874 (1993) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, 
on 14 October 1993 
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993 and 853 
(1993) of 
29 July 1993, and recalling the statement read by the President of the Council, on behalf of 
the Council, on 18 August 1993 (S/26326), Having considered the letter dated 1 October 
1993 from the Chairman of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(S/26522), Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the 
Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the 
Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would 
endanger peace and security in the region, Taking note of the high-level meetings which took 
place in Moscow on 
8 October 1993 and expressing the hope that they will contribute to the improvement of the 
situation and the peaceful settlement of the conflict, Reaffirming the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region, 
Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of 
force for the acquisition of territory, Expressing once again its grave concern at the human 
suffering the conflict has caused and at the serious humanitarian emergency in the region and 
expressing in particular its grave concern at the displacement of large numbers of civilians in 
the Azerbaijani Republic, 
1. Calls upon the parties concerned to make effective and permanent the cease-fire 
established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government 
of the Russian Federation in support of the CSCE 
Minsk Group; 
93-55741 (E) /... 
S/RES/874 (1993) 
Page 2 
2. Reiterates again its full support for the peace process being pursued within the framework 
of the CSCE, and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group; 
3. Welcomes and commends to the parties the "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to 
implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" set out on 28 September 
1993 at the meeting of the CSCE Minsk Group and submitted to the parties concerned by the 
Chairman of the Group with the full support of nine other members of the Group, and calls on 
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the parties to accept it; 
4. Expresses the conviction that all other pending questions arising from the conflict and not 
directly addressed in the "Adjusted timetable" should be settled expeditiously through 
peaceful negotiations in the context of the CSCE Minsk process; 
5. Calls for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps provided for in 
the CSCE Minsk Group’s "Adjusted timetable", including the withdrawal of forces from 
recently occupied territories and the removal of all obstacles to communications and 
transportation; 
6. Calls also for an early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference for the purpose of 
arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict as provided for in the timetable, in 
conformity with the 24 March 1992 mandate of the CSCE Council of Ministers; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to respond favourably to an invitation to send a 
representative to attend the CSCE Minsk Conference and to provide all possible assistance 
for the substantive negotiations that will follow the opening of the Conference; 
8. Supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE; 
9. Calls on all parties to refrain from all violations of international humanitarian law and 
renews its call in resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993) for unimpeded access for 
international humanitarian relief efforts in all areas affected by the conflict; 
10. Urges all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any interference or 
intervention which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and 
security in the region; 
11. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent 
humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population and to assist refugees and 
displaced persons to return to their homes in security and dignity; 
12. Requests also the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the 
Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference to continue to report to the Council on the progress 
of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on the ground, and on present and 
future cooperation between the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard; 
13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
----- 
 
Source:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/557/41/PDF/N9355741.pdf?OpenElement 
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APPENDIX D 
UN Resolution Act : N-884 
Calls on withdrawal of occupying forces from recently occupied Azerbaijani district of 
Zangilan, calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence on the occupying 
forces, and city of Goradiz and reaffirms UN Resolutions 822, 853, 874. 
 
UNITED NATIONS                                                                                  S 
Security Council 
Distr. 
GENERAL 
S/RES/884 (1993) 
12 November 1993 
RESOLUTION 884 (1993) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th meeting, 
on 12 November 1993 
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 
29 July 1993 and 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993,Reaffirming its full support for the peace 
process being pursued within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group,Taking note of the 
letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Minsk Conference on 
Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council and its enclosures 
(S/26718, annex), Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and 
around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions 
between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and 
security in the region, Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as consequence of 
the violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those violations, 
in particular the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz in the Azerbaijani 
Republic, Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic 
and of all other States in the region,reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders 
and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, expressing grave 
concern at the latest displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian 
emergency in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern 
frontier, 
1. Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between the parties, which 
resulted in a resumption of hostilities, and particularly condemns the occupation of the 
Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, 
93-63120 (E) /... 
S/RES/884 (1993) 
Page 2 
attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic; 
2. Calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the 
Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 
(1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided 
with the means to extend their 
military campaign further; 
3. Welcomes the Declaration of 4 November 1993 of the nine members of the CSCE Minsk 
Group (S/26718) and commends the proposals contained therein for unilateral cease-fire 
declarations; 
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4. Demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and 
hostile acts, the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and the 
city of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of occupying forces from other recently occupied areas 
of the Azerbaijani Republic in accordance with the "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to 
implement Securit Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" (S/26522, appendix) as 
amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993; 
5. Strongly urges the parties concerned to resume promptly and to make effective and 
permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the 
assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the CSCE Minsk Group, 
and to continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the CSCE 
Minsk process and the "Adjusted timetable" as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting 
in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993; 
6. Urges again all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any 
interference or intervention, which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine 
peace and security in the region; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent 
humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population, including that in the Zangelan 
district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern frontier, and to assist refugees 
and displaced persons to return to their homes in security and dignity; 
8. Reiterates its request that the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and 
the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference continue to report to the Council on the 
progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on the ground, in particular 
on the implementation of its relevant resolutions, and on present and future cooperation 
between the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard; 
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
-- 
Source:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/631/20/PDF/N9363120.pdf?OpenEleme
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